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STANDING, THE 'NEW PROPERTY,' AND
THE COSTS OF WELFARE: DILEMMAS
IN AMERICAN AND WEST GERMAN.
PROVIDER-ADMINISTRATION
Robert Dugan*
The controversy over standing to contest administrative actions is
not unique to the United States. In West Germany, a similar debate
is being conducted with equal rigor and animation. The controversy
in the United States is whether the plaintiff's standing must rest upon
a violated right, an injury-in-fact, or both.' Article 19(IV) of the
West German Constitution resolves this particular issue in favor of
the violated-right standard: "Should any person's right be violated by
public authority, recourse to the court shall be open to him."'
The force exerted by Article 19 (IV) upon West Germany's law of
standing is best illustrated by a famous 1954 decision8 of the West
German Federal Administrative Court.4 The plaintiff, a sixty-sevenyear-old man, shared a two-room apartment with an elderly woman;
both parties received welfare. The plaintiff's allowance included
amounts for a housekeeper and half of the apartment rent. The welfare agency denied the plaintiff's request for a full rent coverage on
the ground that the woman's welfare check also contained a rent allowance. Plaintiff then sued to compel the administrator to grant his
* B.A., Stanford University, 1963, MA., 1964; 3.D., University of Chicago, 1967,
M.C.L., 1969.
1. Compare 3 K. DAVIS, ADmrEn-SrhATvrE LAW TREATisE § 22.02 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAvis, ADmIaSnRATV LAW] and Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35
U. CHL L. Rxv. 601, 617-18, 623, 628-29 (1968), with L. JAFEE, JUDICUM ConrnaoL ox
ADunrmsATnV AcnioN 501, 509-10, 524-26, 529 (1965).
2. Grundgesetz ffirdie Bundesrepublik Deutschland § 19(IV) [hereinafter cited as
GG]. For translation, see 3 PEAsLsx, CoNsTITuTioNs oF NATIONs-EuRoPE 361 at 365

(rev. 3d ed. 1968), [hereinafter cited as PEASLEE] which reprints the official translation.
3. ENrscnxmEUor DES BuwDESVERWALTuxGSGmucHM, vol. 1 at 159 (1954) [here-

inafter referred to in the text as the welfare case] [hereinafter, decisions of the West
German Federal Administrative Court will be cited as, e.g., 7 BVerwGE 159 (1954).] As
regards this particular case, see Pakuscher, Administrative Law in Germany-Citizen v.
State, 16 Am- J. Coan'. L. 309, 321-22 (1968).
4. For a first-hand description of the function and history of the West German Administrative Courts, see Pakuscher, Administrative Law in Germany-Citizen v. State, 16
Aar. 3. Comn,. L. 309, 310-14 (1968). The author is a judge on the Federal Administrative Court in West Berlin.
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rent claim. The "violated right" standard of Article 19(IV) of the
West German Constitution forced the Court to decide whether or not
there exists a right to welfare.
The court began by observing that the plaintiff's claim involved a
mandatory, rather than a discretionary, grant of assistance. 5 Whenever
the prerequisites of a mandatory norm are met, the administrator
must confer the prescribed assistance. This initial determination undoubtedly made the case easier but did not end the matter. Under
German public law, an obligation imposed by statute upon the state
does not always create a corresponding right in the citizen.6 This
anomaly is not unique to West German law,7 but is a direct consequence of two fundamental principles of Western political thought:
the rule of law and the notion of democracy.8
In the welfare case, the administrator had successfully contended
at the trial and lower appellate levels that, despite the imperative
wording of the statute, the plaintiff had no "right" to welfare. Accordingly, the complaint had been dismissed for lack of standing. Although the Federal Administrative Court eventually reached the
opposite conclusion, it did not deny the fact that, prior to World War
II, welfare had indeed been granted in the public interest, rather than
for the good of the individual recipient. The court noted that administrative law had long viewed welfare activities as a type of police
administration: welfare protected society from the vices which often
proceed from grinding poverty.9 The recipient was not a beneficiary
but merely an object through whom the police power was channelled
in order to achieve the desired social goal of public order.
The Federal Administrative Court repudiated this view of welfare
assistance and thereby invited increased judicial supervision over the
5. A mandatory norm has the form: if facts A, B, and C are present then D shall
be consequence. A discretionary statute has, in contrast, the following form: if facts A,
B, and C are present, then the administrator may remain inactive or resort to one of
the consequences D, E, or F; see 1 WoLFF, VERWALTuNOSRECHT 144-55 (6th ed. 1965).
6. See 1 WOLFF, VERWALTUNOSRECHT 233 (6th ed. 1965); FoRsTJor, LEHRBUCH DEs
VERwALTwrI'SREC]TS, Bd. 1. Ailgemeiner Tell 178-80 (9th ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited
as FoRsTHor1, VERWALTUNGSRECHT]; HENKE, DAS SUBJEKTIVE 6FFENTLICHE RECT, 4043 (1968).
7. See 1 DAVIs, ADMnmSTRATiVE LAW §§ 7.11-7.19; cf. Reich, The New Property,
73 YALE L.J. 733, 739-42 (1964).
8. Cf. HENKE, DAS SUBJEETIVE 6OFNTLICHE RECHT 41-42 (1968); see also text
accompanying notes 22-24, infra.
9.
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VERWALTUNGSRECET 186-88 (2d ed. 1967).

Standing and New Property
West German citizen's relationship to the State. 10 The German Court
justified its rejection of the traditional view on several grounds. First,
Articles 1 and 2(I) of the new Constitution vouchsafed the citizen's
dignity and the right to free development of his personality." According to the Court, this guaranty militated against the practice of using
the individual as a "mere means" to achieve a social end. Second, the
Court found that the traditional view of welfare was antithetical to
the Constitution's designation of West Germany as a "democracy."'
A citizen could not exercise his electoral mandate in an independent
manner unless he was secure as regards the elementary needs of existence.' 3 Finally, the court -relied upon the fact that the Constitution
4 This term translates
also describes West Germany as a Sozialstaat."
approximately as a "state of social justice," and implies that the state
bears an obligation to provide the individual with the basic necessities
of existence.' 5
The West German Federal Administrative Court held that these
constitutional considerations could only be satisfied by recognizing an
individual right to welfare benefits. This conclusion enabled the plaintiff to allege a violated right and thereby achieve standing to challenge
the welfare administrator's action. It should be noted, however, that
the decision does not hold, as is sometimes contended,' 6 that every
individual has an inherent right to welfare.? Just as a party who en10. See HENXE, DAs SUBjExlmVE OFEN~TCHE RECHT, 118-119 (1968); 3 Worr,
VEwalurNscGsRmT 189-90 (2d ed. 1967); Fomsorr, VERWAl.TUNGSREcHT 182-83 (9th
ed. 1966).
11. GG § 1(I): "The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall
be the duty of all state authority." GG § 2(11): "Everyone shall have the right to life
and to inviolability of his person. The freedom of the individual shall be inviolable."
Translation from PFAsLEE at 361. In the view of many West German scholars, these two
articles are not constitutional norms per se but rather goals for the legislature and
standards of interpretation for the courts; cf. MA~u~z, DEuTscias STAATSPzcRT 94-95,
115 (16th ed. 1968); HESSE, GRUNDiZUGE DES VERmASSUNOSRECcTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEuTscHLAwD 109-117 (1967) [hereinafter cited as HEssE, VznZAssUXGsnCHT.
12. See GG § 20; translated in PEASLEE, supra note 3 at 365.
13. Ci. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.. 733, 756-59 (1964).
14. GG § 20(I); for translation, see PmsLEE at 365.
15. Cf. 1 WoLPF, VzwALruN~sREcHT 47-49 (6th ed. 1965); HEsSE, VERASSUNGSREc~r 81-83 (1967). The same guaranty also seems to be reflected in Article 2(11) of the
West German Constitution, which affirms the citizen's right to life and the inviolability
of his person.
16. Judge Pakuscher, unintentionally I am sure, conveys this impression in Administrative Law in Germany-Citizen v. State, 16 Am:. J. Comp. L. 309, 321 (1968).
17. The plaintiff lost on the merits. The Court held that he possessed a private-law
claim against the woman for one half the rent, which, as an item of wealth, must be
considered in computing his welfare allowance. 1 BVerwGE 159, 162-63 (1954).
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ters a contract does not necessarily have a right to performance or
damages, 8 the would-be welfare recipient possesses only a legal claim
which, among other things, enables him to invoke the aid of the courts.
The immediate effect of the decision in the welfare case has been
a considerable increase in judicial review of welfare administration. 9
The broader impact of the decision relates to the distinction between
the state qua regulator and the state qua provider.2 0 This distinction,
fundamental to West German administrative law, is relevant to the
public law of any industrialized nation.
As a regulator, the state, through its officials, performs acts which
can be characterized as police administration (in the larger sense of
the term): controlling traffic in noxious substances, apprehending criminals, securing public order, and forbidding or supervising hazardous
activities. Such objectives are implemented primarily by restrictions
on the liberty of particular individuals. 21 In contrast, provider-administration seeks to enhance, rather than frustrate, individual interests. Within the last three decades, this type of administrative
behavior has greatly expanded in scope and importance.22 It includes
such diverse governmental activities as old-age and unemployment
insurance, maternity benefits, welfare, scholarships, farm subsidies,

18. Contra HoLmEs, The Path of The Law, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 175 (1920).
This famous dictum ignores, for example, the risk of impossibility of performance not
due to the culpability of either party; cf. Dugan, Miscalculation in Contracts-The Tort
Schema in German and Common Law, 18 BUFFALO L. REv. 441, 447-54 (1969).
19. In any given volume of Federal Administrative Court reports, fifteen to twenty
percent of the decisions have involved welfare controversies such as: what constitutes
"income" and "property" for purposes of calculating welfare needs, 29 BVerwGE 108,
295 (1968); whether welfare can be decreased in order to force the recipient to take a
job, 30 BVerwGE 99 (1968); under what conditions a disabled employee may be dismissed, 30 BVerwGE 141 (1968), 29 BVerwGE 108 (1968); whether a disabled veteran
can be granted financial assistance to become a nature healer, 30 BVerwGE 68 (1968);
when does marital discord justify discontinuing a family welfare allowance, 30 BVerwGE
19 (1968). Compare this to DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (and supplements thereto),
supra note 1, which do not even list "welfare" as an indexed topic, nor treat this very
large area of administrative behavior in any particular subchapter or topic.
20. See FORSTHOFF, VERWALTUNGSRECHT 340-45 (9th ed. 1966).
21. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733-39 (1964); cf. DICKINSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 10-13
(1927), who could still speak of government regulation exclusively in terms of "police
function," "interference," and "regulation."
22. Cf. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, at 737-38 (1964); United States
Bureau of Census, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 276 (89th ed. 1969),
which notes that outlay for total welfare services has increased from 6,548 millions of
dollars (9.5% of G.N.P.) in 1935 to 99,516 millions of dollars (12.99o of G.N.P.) in
1967.
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government contracts, business and education loans, and access to
educational, recreational, and transit facilities.
Today, the average citizen-be he West German or American or,
for that matter, Russian or Chinese-probably has more contact with
the state qua provider than with the state qua regulator. Yet most
rules of contemporary administrative law were formulated during an
era in which state activity was almost exclusively regulatory. State
interference with individual activities was governed by the rile-of-law
principle: the state could restrict individual liberty only under statutory authority. 3 This principle was complemented by the notion of
democracy which insured, at least in theory, that all limitations pro24
ceeded from the will of those governed.
The rule-of-law principle does not satisfactorily apply to facts such
as those of the welfare case which involved not an interference with
liberty, but rather an enhancement of a citizen's interests.2 5 The ruleof-law theory presupposes a state which exhausts its function in various forms of interference. The decision in the welfare case represents
the first step toward providing equivalent protection for the individual
with respect to the noninterference activities of provider-administration.
In the United States, pleas for the creation of rights in governmental provider-administration have been frequent and diverse. Professor
Reich perhaps formulates the problem most eloquently with his concept of "new property,"2 which refers to the numerous forms of
wealth which now emanate from the state: subsidies, licenses, govern23. See DicEy, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDy OF TnE LAW OF TxE CONSTITUTION
202-03, 208 (10th ed. 1959). The same principle is reflected in the U.S. CONST. amend.

XIV, § 1: "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law," and in Article 2(1 and II) of the West German Constitution:
"Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality ... to life and
to inviolability of his person. The freedom of the individual shall be inviolable. These
rights may only be encroached upon pursuant to a law." 3 PEASLEE, at 361-62.
24. The rule of law was the final step in a gradual reversal of the medieval man-state
relationship. That relationship rested on the premise that man's liberties resulted from
contractual or status dispensations from absolute bondage. The Enlightenment replaced
the notion of primordial bondage with the view that man is basically free; his liberties
are acquired automatically at birth; see United States Declaration of Independence para.
2, sent. 1. Thus, the function of legal norms is no longer to engender liberties but to
impose restraints upon them. Compare HENxE, DAS SUBjExTIVM 6FFENTLICHE RECHT
9-13 (1968) with Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 770 (1964).
25. Cf. 1 Worts, VERWALTUNOsRCcT 47-48 (6th ed. 1965); 3 WoLFF, VRWALTUNGSE cHT 189-90 (2d ed. 1967).

26. Reich, The New Property, 73 YAra Lj. 733 (1964).
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ment contracts, welfare benefits. These forms of wealth lack the legal
safeguards which have traditionally accompanied property: they are
nonalienable, subject to expropriation without compensation, and may
be burdened with conditions unrelated to the purpose or function of
the particular item of wealth." Professor Reich apparently favors the
28
creation of substantive rights in this "new property.)
The "new property" has traditionally been dealt with under the
rubric of discretion. Distributions of licenses and welfare, as well as
intervention by the police and public prosecutor, have been deemed
matters of administrative discretion, often immune from judicial review. 9 In addition, certain procedural rules reflect a biased approach
to the "new property." For lack of standing, withdrawal of a subsidy
or issuance of a license cannot be challenged in the courts.30 These
phenomena have prompted the search for new institutions, especially
the Ombudsman, to reduce the potential for abuse in the administration of government largesse.3 1
Economists have also joined the debate over the proper approach
to rights in the "new property." They argue that problems in the
utilization of air-waves, 2 regulation of pollution, 3 costs of the military draft,34 segregation and public school finance, 5 and risk distribution in automobile accidents and products liability, 6 are all traceable
to the absence or improper formulation of individual rights as against
the state. The gist of these legal and economic observations is that,
27. Cf. id. at 734-35, 747-49, 752-56.
28. Id. at 785-86.
29. Cf. 4 DAVIS, AD
r SmTATiVE LAW § 28.16 at 83-85 (Supp. 1965 at 21-23); Reich
at 749-51.
30. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601, 622-28, (1968);
3 DAVIS, ADMIISTRATmvE LAW § 22.16, at 284-85, § 22.12, at 268-69.
31. Prof. Gellhorn's examples often involve either countries with highly developed
provider-administrations, or instances of such administration; see W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS 24-28, 208-18, 385-92 (1966), and W. GET.LHoRN, Vn:EN AmERicANS COmPLAiN 25-28, 195-211 (1966).

32. Cf. Coase, The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee, 5 J. LAW & EcoN.
17, 41-45 (1962); Coase, The Federal Communications Commission 2 J. LAw & EcoN. 1,
7-9, 17-19, 25-27 (1959).
33. See G. J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 110-14 (3d ed. 1966).
34. See A. A. ALCHIAN & W. R. ALLEiN, UNIVERSITY EcoNoMics 418-20 (2d ed. 1967).
35. Cf. West, The Political Economy of American Public School Legislation, 10
J. LAW & EcoN. 101, 114-116 (1967); M. Friedman, DecentralizingSchools, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 18, 1968, at 100, col. 1.
36. See Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J. LAW & EcoN. 61, 62-64
(1966); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 500-08, 519-24 (1961).
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since the government has undertaken extensive functions outside the
traditional calculus of rights and duties, it should now establish legal
institutions appiopriate to safeguard the citizen's interest in the context of these activities.
RIGHTS TO DISCRETIONARY BENEFITS
In the welfare case,3 7 the court found that, under the West German
Constitution, a mandatory norm may extend to the individual a substantive right to welfare benefits. The court explicitly deferred the
more difficult question whether such beneficiary rights could be generated by a discretionary norm. Such a right would seem to contradict
the statutory grant of discretion to the administrator.
In a 1960 decision,18 the West German Federal Administrative
Court sought a solution which would both effectuate the statutory
grant of discretion and yet permit satisfaction of the "violated right"
criterion for standing. In the bandsaw case, the defendant had erected
a power saw on his premises. The noise and dust caused by its operation prompted the plaintiff to ask the police to intervene against what
was, in his view, a clear violation of the zoning laws. After the police
refused to act, the plaintiff sought judicial relief.
The lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. It
invoked the traditional administrative law doctrine that a citizen
has no right to police intervention in his behalf. Since the relevant
statute placed the question of intervention vel non squarely within
the discretion of the authorities, the lower court reasoned that the
police were entitled but not obligated to act. The citizen's only right
was to an abuse-free exercise of discretion 3
The Federal Administrative Court broke with this traditional view
and enunciated a formula which, although far from perfect, has
broadened court review under Article 19(IV). The Court held that a
37. See note 5, supra.
38. 11 BVerwGE 95 (1960) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the bandsaw case].
39. The protection against abusive exercise of discretion can be called a "right" only
in a procedural sense, i.e., it has no particular substantive content but rather serves only
to satisfy the "violated-right" requirement established by GG § 19 (IV). See Henke, Das
subjektive 6ffentliche Recht auf Einschreiten der Polizei, 1964 DaEuscHEs VERwALTuxGsBLATT 649, 650-51 (1964). Jaffe also refers to such a "right" in JunicxAL CoNTROL OF
ADm'IsTRA~rv AcToN at 507-08 (1965).

503

Washington Law Review

Vol. 45: 497, 1970

statute whose application involves an exercise of discretion may create
a right in an affected individual. 0 Prerequisite is that the statute must
have been intended to protect the particular class of persons to which
the plaintiff belongs from the particular harm in question. 4 The grant
of discretion does not, in all cases, prevent the possibility of protection
from constituting a full substantive right. When the absence of alternatives precludes a permissible exercise of discretion, it is legitimate
42
to speak of a substantive right to police intervention.
The theory of the bandsaw case is a slippery extension of the holding in the welfare case. The latter required only a finding that the
statute makes issuance of the benefit mandatory. The doctrine of the
bandsaw case, in contrast, requires extensive statutory interpretation
to determine whether the law seeks not only to enhance the public
good,43 but also to protect particular persons against particular harms.
The welfare and bandsaw cases represent a turning point in West
German administrative law.4 4 They signify the creation of new substantive rights which serve as the basis for a litigable claim to government largesse. Together, they suggest an inchoate solution to the
problems posed by the new property. A survey of subsequent cases
demonstrates, however, that they have not been an overly fecund
source of protection.4 5 The difficulties may derive not from any defects

40. 11 BVerwGE 95, 97; cf. 1 WorF, VERwALTwNmsREcm 233 (6th ed. 1965).
41. See parallel formulations in Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others 35 U. CHr L.
REv. at 625-27 (1968) and JAFFE, JuarcrAL CONTROL or An ai-mSrUATrxv AcTION 509,
511 (1965).

42. See also 1 WOLFF,

VERWALTUNGSRECHT

155-56 (6th ed. 1965).

43. This approach, which relies upon what might be termed "the intention of the
norm," has met with much more criticism in West Germany than in the United States.
Compare Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHm. L. Rv. at 625-27 (1968)
and JAFFE, JunicAL CONTROL or ADmSiTRAmv AcTION 509, 511 (1965) with Menger,
Hichstrichterliche Rechtssprechung zum Verwaltungsrecht, 1966 VERwALTUNsAR IrrV
180, 180-81 (1966); 1 Wor, VERwALTUNGsREcHT 233 (6th ed. 1965); and HixEr,
DAS SUBJE11TIVE 6O"rNTLrcHE RECT 60-61, 75-77 (1968). The gist of the criticism is
that the approach usually invokes or yields an arbitrary interpretation of the statute
without exposing the underlying social and economic considerations. For example, in a
recent case, the plaintiff storeowner demanded that the police enforce the evening
closing laws against a competitor. The court rejected his suit noting that the laws were
"designed" to protect personnel from overwork and not the competitive interests. De-

cision of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht reprinted in 19

VERwALTuNGSRECHTssPRECHUNo

371 (1967).

44.

Cf.

HENKE, DAS

SUBJEKTIVE

6FFENTLiCHE RECHT,

117-19 (1968); Pakuscher,

Administrative Law in Germany, 16 Am. J. Co w. L. 309, 321 (1968).
45. But see Pakuscher id., at 325-27, 330-31.
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in the doctrine itself but rather from fundamental legal and economic
dilemmas in provider-administration.
1. Subsidies
The welfare case involved administration of largesse pursuant to a
mandatory statute. The benefits in the bandsaw case accrued pursuant
to a discretionary statute. The next step in the progression would be
benefits which are granted without any statutory basis whatever. This
was, in fact, the traditional character of subsidies under West German
administrative law.48 The absence of statutory authorization was justified on the ground that, since subsidies do not directly restrict personal liberties, they lie outside the rule-of-law principle.
This approach to governmental subsidies had two important consequences. First, the absence of statutes generally deprives the citizen
of a valuable source of information. Lobbies and interest groups fill
this gap; they seek not only to learn what funds are available, and
for what purposes, but also to influence the structure of the basic
document of authorization, the national budget.47 Second, and no less
important, the citizen could not contest administration of the subsidies
for which he might be eligible. His traditional rights against the state
were protected only against unwarranted interferences. The absence
of statutes prevented the citizen from alleging any "new rights" under the doctrine of the welfare and bandsaw cases. These two factors
prompted a number of West German jurists to propose "normalization," i.e., codification of subsidy programs and the state-subsidee
relationship 8
In 1958, the Federal Administrative Court examined the necessity
of statutory authorization for subsidy benefits in connection with a

46. See 3 WoLrF, VERwALTuNGsRECT
3 220-22 (2d ed. 1967); FoRsIHoaF, VERWALTvNGsREcHF 95, 118 (9th ed. 1966).
47. Evers, Verbdnde-Verwaltung-Verfassung, 1964 DER STAAT 41, 49-50 (1964).
48. Cf. FoRsmo,, VERWA.TuGSRnEcT 95, 118-19 (9th ed. 1966); Stem, Rechtsjragen
der iffentlichen Subventionierung Privater, 1961 JMMTI5ENZEITU1'G 518, 522-25 (1961). In
contrast to the United States, in West Germany the proper legal approach to subsidies
has been one of the most controversial subjects of contemporary administrative law.
The West German public law professors have twice made it the topic of their annual
meeting; see VERFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VE SENIGUMO

Ma DEuTSCHEN STAATsRECHTSLE

E,

vols. 19 (1961) and 25 (1967).
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price-support system for domestically refined fats and oils.4 9 A central
administrative agency assumed a fixed portion of the costs of production, at one rate for "small" manufacturers and at a lower rate for
"large" manufacturers. If a manufacturer's income exceeded his costs,
he had to deliver a portion of his profits to the agency. The agency
ordered the plaintiff-manufacturer to pay a $6,000 surplus, which
resulted from characterizing the plaintiff as a "large" manufacturer.
The manufacturer attacked this levy for want of statutory authorization.
The decision of the Federal Administrative Court only moderately
advanced the cause of normalization. The Court held that the kind of
authorization varied with the type of subsidy program involved. If
the program entailed both potential benefits and potential disadvantages, a thoroughly detailed statutory authorization must exist. A
program which solely conferred benefits required less detailed authorization; a mere budget appropriation to the particular agency would
suffice. The fact that the legislature could make such appropriations
highly specific and at frequent intervals would, in the long run, preserve the rule-of-law principle in the area of subsidy-administration.
Rather cryptically, the court concluded that "other expressions of
parliamentary will might also serve as a basis for such administrative
activity."
The Court's concluding reference to "other expressions of parliamentary will" attracted considerable academic discussion. 0 The proponents of normalization saw in the decision a latent judicial
willingness to recognize a norm-producing device less cumbersome,
less vague, and less time-consuming than the "general and abstract"
statute. A year later, however, the Federal Administrative Court refused to recognize such a lesser expression of legislative will.5' The
Parliament had enacted a statute which authorized rebates on diesel
fuel used in domestic shipping. This statute directed the administrator
to maintain the "competitive nature" of the industry existing as of a

6 BVerwGE 282 (1958).
See Stern, Rechtsjragen der 5ffentlichen Subventionierung Privater, 1960 JuRisTENZEITUNG 518, 527 (1960) ; ZrLEEo, DtE RECHTSFORM DER SUsVENoIGNEN 23-25 (1965);
FORSTNOFr, VERWALTUNCSRECHT 95, 118 (9th ed. 1966).
51. Decision of the Federal Administrative Court reprinted in 1961 N~uE JuRisTIscHE
W'OCHENSCHRIFT 1785 (1961).
49.
50.
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certain date. On the basis of this mandate, the administrator denied
rebates to ships in tourist and commercial passenger service. The Parliament immediately passed a resolution urging retroactive inclusion
of tourist ships in the subsidy program. The administrator responded
with a new regulation under which tourist ships would receive subsidies prospectively.
Relying on the Parliamentary resolution, the owner of a tourist
ship sued to recover subsidies which he had "lost" in the time between
the resolution and the new regulation. He contended that the resolution was one of those "other expressions of Parliament's will" which
were binding upon the administrator qua provider. The Federal Administrative Court disagreed. In its view, the statute afforded beneficiaries only a right to abuse-free exercise of the agency's discretion in
its evaluation of the "competitive nature" of the shipping industry.
Not even an unanimous parliamentary resolution, as was involved in
this case, could alter the public law relationship fixed by statute.
In light of the current agitation to "normalize" welfare activities,
this decision considerably strengthens the hand of the administrator.
The courts will protect his discretion even against the force of an unanimous parliamentary resolution. The parliamentary resolution
provided one thdoretically feasible means of augmenting legislative
control over subsidy-administration. Unlike a statute, a resolution may
(and often does) focus on an individual case. Moreover, the legislative
resolution machinery is quicker and more responsive to immediate
52
needs than is the formal procedure for enacting statutes.
The Court's refusal to require a statutory basis for subsidy-administration has obstructed development of a general right to subsidies
under the doctrine of the welfare and bandsaw cases. Indeed, the
Court's action is more than a simple converse application of the ruleof-law principle (i.e., no statutory basis is required unless direct interference is involved). In effect, the Court has implicitly approved the
contention that statutes are incompatible with the purpose and function of subsidies.53 The denial of rights to subsidies follows as a cor-

52.

Ci. Bellstedt, Bedfirfen Subventionen gesetzlicher Grundlagen? 1961 DiE 6mNsT-

LIcHE VEawALTuxo 161 (1961) and authorities cited supra note 49.
53. The incompatibility of statutes and subsidies is generally derived from the ultimate role of subvention; subsidies are given either to alleviate an emergency or to

507

Washington Law Review

Vol. 45: 497, 1970

ollary of this incompatibility. However, as suggested below, such a
denial can be better justified by focusing directly upon the notion of
rights in government largesse.
Although the Federal Administrative Court denied the existence of
rights to subsidies, it has agreed to hear challenges to subsidies
granted competitors. A recent case54 involved a corporation which
purchased, processed, fermented, and stored fruit juice and later bottled and retailed the wine. It competed with a large number of smaller
vintners' cooperatives which received government subsidies for the
acquisition of vinting equipment. The corporation's application for
similar subsidies had been denied on the ground that the firm was not
a cooperative. The Court held that, for standing purposes, the plaintiff
could allege a violated right because the denial of subsidies might
eventually destroy its business and its freedom to compete as guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. 5
2. Education
The administrative courts have not hesitated to intervene in nearly
every administrative aspect of the West German school system; scholarships, school finance, academic advancement, and even examination
grading procedures. A recent scholarship case 56 concerned a young
man who had completed a course in technical drafting at a public
trade school, served an apprenticeship, and then practiced successfully
as a master draftsman for several years. At the age of twenty-one, he

facilitate realization of an economic plan. Their effectiveness in the latter service depends
upon the administrator's ability to respond to the emergency which endangers the plan.
Thus, in either case, the administration of subsidies is ultimately emergency-oriented.
Because emergencies are, by definition, unforeseeable, no meaningful abstract and general
norms (statutes) can be promulgated aforehand to determine the class of beneficiaries.
Administration of subsidies, if it is to be effective, must be conducted on a discretionary
basis. The Parliament must be satisfied with establishing procedural safeguards incidental
to the issuance and withdrawal of subvention. Compare Schlechter, Klageformnen bei der
verwaltungsrechtlichen Durchsetzung von Subventionsanspriichen, 1966 DauTscmzs VaWALTUNGSBLATT, 738, 741-42, with FoasTsosr, VERWALTUNGSRECHT 118 (9th ed. 1966) and
Forsthoff, 1957 DEUTSCHFS VERWALTUTNGS3LATT 724, 725-26. One state administrative court
has even labelled statutes as "an 18th Century solution to 20th Century problems;" see
decision of the Hessian State Supreme Administrative Court reprinted in 1959 DIE
O.FFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 706 (1959).
54. 30 BVerwGE 191 (1968).
55. For translation of GG § 2, see note 11 supra. GG § 3(I): "All persons shall be
equal before the law;" see 3 PEASLEE, supra note 3, at 362.
56. 27 BVerwGE 58 (1967).
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entered a university preparatory school and applied for state financial
support. Assistance was denied on the ground that the applicant had
already acquired the ability to earn a living.
The Federal Administrative Court ordered the state agency to reconsider his application. In the Court's view, welfare assistance should
not only secure the recipient's basic economic needs but should also
encourage the individual to fully develop his abilities and potential.
The Court observed that a West German child has little control over
his future at the time when he is shunted into a manual trade school.
In another case,57 the Court found that an administrative agency
had abused its discretion by denying financial assistance solely because the student-applicant had not complied with the time limit prescribed in the federal scholarship program. The Court ordered the
administrator to reconsider the application in light of the student's
program and personal problems, crowded classroom conditions, and
the breadth of the subject matter being studied.
Whenever a court begins to allocate resources, it runs the risk of
embarrassment in the unusual situation. In one recent case, the Federal Administrative Court affirmed a denial of assistance to a fortythree year old doctoral candidate 8 who had studied for fifteen years
and now sought financial aid while completing his dissertation. By way
of contrast, it reversed a denial of assistance to an injured veteran
who wanted to become a nature healer.59
School finance is the one area in which the Federal Administrative
Court has explicitly recognized a right to subsidies. In the leading
case, 60 a private school which was certified for teaching creative dance
and gymnastics applied for state aid to defray personnel and operating
costs. The state agency denied assistance on the ground that Article
7(IV) 61 of the Constitution did not authorize a claim for subsidies

57.
58.
59.
60.

28
30
30
23

BVerwGE
BVerwGE
BVerwGE
BVerwGE

317 (1967).
57 (1968).
342 (1968).
347 (1966).

61. GG § 7(IV):
"The right to establish private schools is guaranteed. Private schools, as a substitute
for state or municipal schools, shall require the approval of the state . . . . This
approval must be withheld if the economic and legal position of the teaching staff
is not sufficiently assured."

3 PEAsx;-, supra note 3, at 363.
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but only guaranteed the citizen's right to establish and support private
schools.
The Federal Administrative Court found that the state, by offering
a profusion of services not available to private institutions, threatened
to obviate the guaranty of Article 7(IV). The Court conceded that
these services were offered in fulfillment of the state's obligation to
provide education. However, the Court held that, so long as private
schools partially relieve the state of its obligation, Article 7 and the
Constitution's equality provision engender a right to educational subsidies.
Although the school subsidy case met with generally adverse criticism,62 the Federal Administrative Court promptly reaffirmed and
elaborated its views in an even more difficult case.63 A state statute
required a private engineering school to pay fifteen (later, seven and
one half) per cent of its own operating costs. The school sought total
defrayal of its expenses on the basis of a provision which empowered
the school authorities to dispense completely with the self-support
requirement. The Court reiterated its view that a de facto state monopoly of education was incompatible with the Constitution and that
the state's responsibility to insure a just social order required it to
secure the existence of private schools which could function under
Article 7. With this observation, the Federal Administrative Court in
effect extended an institutional guaranty to private schools.6" The
Court ordered that the amount of subvention must cover all operating
costs not traceable to bad management.
One of the most delicate types of litigation before the administrative courts has been judicial review of examination and grading procedures in high schools and universities. Review of examination grades
62.

Cf. Menger, Hdchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung zum Verwaltungsrecht, 1966 VER-

"VALTUNOSARCnIV 377, 378-79 (1966); Weber, 1966 NEuE Jup-TsfTscHE WocHEmNscHmrr

1798 (1966).
63. 27 BVerwGE 360 (1967).
64. The institutional guaranty is one of the most controversial topics of West German
constitutional law. The theory is that traditional individual rights are insufficient to
preserve certain social institutions which are necessary for the continued existence of
democracy and social justice. See HEssE, VERFASSUNGSRECnT 111 (1967); Scheuner,
Pressefreiheit, 22 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHIMLEHrRER 1, 47-60 (1965). The courts have accorded such guaranty to the family, 6
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerf GE] 55, 72 (1957), 10 BVerfGE
59, 66 (1959) ; the press, 10 BVerfGE 118, 121 (1959), 12 BVerfGE 205, 260 (1961);
religious instruction, 6 BVerfGE 309, 355 (1957).
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is possible because they are considered administrative acts.6 The
court's function is to ascertain whether the examiner relied on untrue
68
factual considerations, failed to follow prescribed rules of weighting,
or was moved by irrelevant considerations.

7

In connection with uni-

versity examinations, the administrative courts have established a rule
that the student must receive an uncorrected copy of his paper plus a

statement of the reasons for his failure.6 8 The courts have also intervened to require that the mid-semester grade be considered in the
final evaluation of the student's performance.6 9
3. Other cases

As in the United States, the competitor's suit has often been the
focus of the standing controversy in West Germany. 7° In a typical
situation, the owner of a taxicab service received a permit for an additional cab and other taxi owners sought to contest the issuance of
the license. 1' The Federal Administrative Court noted that standing
would have to derive from a "right to be protected against competition." The legal literature, for the most part, affirms the existence of

65. The concept of "administrative act" is fundamental to West German administrative law; see Bachof, German Administrative Law, 2 INT'L & Coam. L.Q. 368, 371-72
(1953); Evans, French and German Administrative Law, 14 INTI'L & Coam. L.Q. 1104,
1109 (1965); YERMANN-FRnMan, VERWALTUNGAGEMICHrTSORDNuNG § 42, Rdnr. 12 (4th
ed. 1965). An administrative act is defined as an "administrative measure in the area of
public law which effects a legal disposition of an individual case." Traditionally, court
review of administrative behavior was only possible if the behavior qualified as an
"administrative act." See 1 WoLFF, VERWALTUN0SMEcH 260-69 (6th ed. 1965). The 1960
Code of Federal Administrative Court Procedure lessens the significance of the "administrative act" doctrine in that it authorizes a complaint for contesting official
behavior which has not risen to the status of an administrative act, see EvERmwNFR6HLER, VF.RWALTNGSGEMUCHTSORDN-UNG § 42, Rdnm. 14, 17. Nonetheless, review often
remains coeval with the interpretation of "administrative act;" see, e.g. 27 BVerwGE
181 (1967) where the Federal Administrative Court held that a traffic sign constituted
an "administrative act" and was, therefore, subject to court review. (The court ordered
its removal).
66. Decision of the Bavarian State Administrative Court reprinted in 19 VawATUXGSRECE'TSSPREC UNG 155 (1964).
67. 8 BVerwGE 272 (1959).
68. 19 BVerwGE 128 (1964); see also the decision of State Supreme Administrative
Court of Rheinland-Pfalz, reprinted in 20 VERWALTUNGSRECHTSPRECRUNG 23 (1968).
69. Compare decision of the Oberverwaltungsgericht Milnster, reprinted in 19 VERWALTUNGSRECHTSPRECmJNG 780 (1967) with decision of the Oberverwaltungsgericht Hamburg, reprinted in 19 VERWALTUNGSSECHTSPREMUNG 780 (1968).
70. Cf. HEN=, DAs susyExnr6FFENTicnE RcHT 71-81 (1965); EymzmAsrFRoBmLER, VERWALTUNGSGERICBTSORDNU'G § 42, Rdnr. 98 (4th ed. 1965).
71. 16 BVerwGE 187 (1963).
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such a right;7 authors cite the statutory provision which states that
the law's purpose is to protect the taxicab industry against ruinous
competition. The Federal Administrative Court, however, held that
this provision "serves only the public interest in maintaining a reliable
[and expensive?] transportation service." It does not elevate the interest of the cab drivers to the status of right.
In contrast to the competitor cases, the courts have allowed standing to disappointed applicants, usually on the basis of their right to
abuse-free exercise of agency discretion. 3 In one representative
case,74 the plaintiff's application for a DUsseldorf cab license had been
denied solely on the ground that 1,435 others preceded him on the
waiting list. The Court approved the DUsseldorf priority system as a
means of dispensing the 450 available licenses among four times as
many applicants. This priority system utilized a waiting list, entry in
which depended upon annual reapplication and periodic checks upon
reliability and suitability. The Court held that under such a system, a
denial based solely upon the applicant's position on the list constituted
an abuse of discretion. Instead, the authorities must inform the applicant of his classification respecting each of the criteria in the priority system.
Probably the most frequent noncommercial type of litigation before
the West German administrative courts has involved the issuance
of residential building permits.7 , Neighbors frequently contest the issuance of permits for construction of garages or other additions which
will either abut upon their property or at least extend beyond the
original building easement on the applicant's property. The courts
have consistently denied standing in these cases.7 ' Although the applicable statute cites "danger to the vicinity" as a ground for denying
a permit, this limitation is not, in the view of the courts, a sufficiently
specific grant of protection to engender rights in any particular neighbor. The courts also stress that, as a practical matter, it would be dif-

72.

73.
74.
75.

1 WOLFE, VERWALTUNGSRECUT 203 (7th ed. 1968).

See note 38, supra.
16 BVerwGE 190 (1963).
Cf. HENKE, DAS SUBjEKTIVE 6FFENTLICHE RECHT 81-90 (1965); EFE NFR6nLER, VERIVALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG § 42, Rdnr. 98 (4th ed. 1965).
76. 22 BVerwGE 129 (1965); see also 27 BVerwGE 29 (1967), 28 BVerwGE 29
(1967) and 28 BVerwGE 268 (1967).
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ficult rationally to limit the number of neighbors who might contest
the permit. This would, in turn, encumber the relationship between
the building contractor and the applicant with an intolerable degree
of uncertainty. Years might pass before a proposed structure could
be erected without fear of challenge. The courts have also rejected
the contention that a building easement on the applicant's land is actually a property right of his neighbors so that any alteration of the
7
easement would constitute an expropriation. 7
Such grounds for denying standing are specious. Neither the wording of the statute nor the practical exigencies are any more inimical to
the creation of substantive rights than were the facts and statutes
involved in the welfare and bandsaw cases. Such statutes do not of
themselves either engender or preclude new rights. 71 When a court
holds a priori to the contrary, it is avoiding its responsibility to weigh
the political and economic factors which support the creation or denial
of protection. The building-permit cases, for example, involve the
economics of external benefits and detriments. 79 Article 19 (IV) of the
Constitution invites the courts to solve the problem by explicitly
recognizing rights in building easements and allocating them to either
owners or neighbors. 0
CONCLUSION
1. Evaluation of Theoretical Differences
In German administrative law, as at legendary Common Law, the
controversy over standing to sue is dominated by the notion of
"violated right." Its primacy is rooted in the Constitution, imple77. See 28 BVerwGE 29, 31 (1967).
78. Cf. 1 WorxL,

VERWALTUNGSREc

T 232-34 (6th ed. 1965); HlEE, DAS suBjEzxTI

REcE 81-83, 86-90 (1965).
79. See STIGLER, TnEORY or PascE 110-14 (3d ed. 1966); Coase, Problem of Social
Costs, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1, 2-10 (1960).
80. The allocation does not necessarily control the ultimate use of the land, i.e.,
whether as a garage (in conformity with the owner's desires) or as lawn or garden (as
per the wishes of his neighbor). See G. STIGLER, Tn-oRy OF PaicE 113 (3d ed. 1966);
Coase, Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1, 8-15 (1960). However, this result
depends upon such rarified assumptions in respect to income distribution and contracting
costs that it remains, at present, a theoretical curiosity. Worse still, it is doubtful whether
it really overcomes the "insoluble bilateral monopoly problem with all its indeterminacies
and non-optimalities," with which it appears to deal. Samuelson, Modern Economic
Realities and Individualism, ConLErD ScemNmzc PAPEAs 1411 (1966).
bFzENTLCcE
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mented by statute, and acknowledged by the courts of the country.
The unquestioned acceptance of this criterion contrasts sharply with
the American approach to the standing problem. In Germany, neither
the cases nor the literature make any reference to the aggravation-infact standard which has received so much attention in the United
States."1
A corollary to the violated-right criterion is the German emphasis
upon the notion of provider-administration. Both in the United States
and in West Germany, the standing controversy has derived chiefly
from the absence of rights in government largesse. The violated-right
standard encourages experimentation with a new set of legally protected interests; thus, we have encountered judicial debates over the
existence of rights to subsidies, welfare payments, and freedom from
competition, inter alia."2 These rights, when recognized, not only
satisfy standing requirements but also provide a basis for substantive
claims against the state.8 3
The analytic soundness of the violated-right standard is too easily
overlooked. The alternative criterion of "aggravation in fact" neither
simplifies nor rationalizes the traditional Common Law and German
approach. 4 Proponents of the aggravation-in-fact standard contend
that detriment (damnum) is always antecedent to legal wrong (injuria). In their view it is circular to make "violated right" the primary
criterion, for whether an injustice has occurred will depend upon the
court's treatment of the standing question. 5 They argue that the ag81. Davis is undoubtedly the most outspoken proponent of the injury-in-fact standard; see Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601, 611-15, 629 (1968) ;
DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 22.02, 22.04, at 51-53 (Supp. 1965) ; Compare EYERMANNTFR61HLER, VERWALTUNGSGERICHrSORDNUNG

§ 42, Rdnrn. 90, 96 (4th ed. 1965) who flatly

states that injury is not enough, with HENxE, DAS SUBJEKTIVE OFFENTLicEE RECHT 60-61,

76-80 (1965) who proposes that injury may suffice providing that it is the type of
detriment contemplated by the particular statute.
82. Cf. text accompanying notes 10-17, 59-63, 69-71, supra.
83. A true "substantive claim" is one, like those of private law, which exists independently of the other party's acquiescence to suit; cf. Henke, Das subjektive 5ffentliche
Recht au Eingreijen der Polizei, 1964 DErTSC3ES VERWALTUNGSBLATP 649, 652-54 (1964).
Jaffe makes a similar point when he doubts the wisdom of making substantive rights
dependent upon procedural rights. Compare L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CoNTRoL or AoDmzmsTRATIVE ACTION 501-02 (1965) with DAVIS, ADmiNsTRATivE LAW § 22.04, at 216.
84. Ci. DAvIs, ADmiNISTRATIvE LAW § 22.0, at 211.

85.

See DAvIs, ADMINISTRATaVE LAW § 22.04, at 216. The same vicious circle bothers

West German administrative law jurists; cf. EYERMANN-FR6HLER, VERWALTUNGSGERICHTS-

SORDNUNc § 42, Rdnrn. 96-97 (4th ed. 1965); Henke, Das subjektive iffentliche Recht au!
Einschreiten der Polizei, 1964 DEUTScHES VERWALT NOsBLATT 649, 650-51 (1964).
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gravation-in-fact standard lies outside this circle. Injury appears as a
certain state of affairs, an easily recognizable and objective indicium. 8
Rights, in contrast, are more evanescent, often lying inchoate between
the lines of statute, in long-forgotten dicta, or at the basis of a novel
policy argument.
Analysis of the notion of injury reveals that the circle cannot be so
easily exorcised or avoided. Injury is not only inseparable from the
notion of violated right but is, if anything, subsequent to it. Just as
not every interest equals a right, not every disappointment or frustration constitutes an injury in the legal sense. Disappointment becomes
injury only when the frustration has a pecuniary value.8 7 However,
pecuniary value is unique to protected interests or rights; it derives
from and attaches to the exclusionary power which such a right affords
its holder.8 Consequently, injury can only occur in connection with a
violated right.
Consider, for example, the licensing cases where a competitor
challenges the issuance of a new license. Economic ideology precludes
finding a right of immunity from competition, wrongful injury to
which would satisfy the traditional standing requirement.8 9 Instead, it
is urged that the injury which is "obviously" present in such cases
should suffice as a basis for standing. 0 However, to deny the presence
of a right and simultaneously acknowledge the existence of an injury
involves a contradiction in terms. The injury involved in such cases is,
presumably, a diminution of the value of the competitor's business as
a result of the issuance of the new license. But the value of his business is determined by the rights incidental to his own license. If the
license comprehends (as we assume) no right to be free of competition,
then this fact will be taken into consideration by those individuals
86. Cf. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cnrx. L. REv. 601, 617-18, 621
(1968); DAvIS, Armmnm-RAx=W LAW § 22.04, at 222.
87. See 5 A. CoiRm, CoB3NI oxNCoNTRAcxs § 1003, at 36-38, § 1004, at 46-50 (1964).
88. Cf. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Amr. EcoN. REv. 347, 350,
354-56 (1967); Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights 9 J. LAW & EcoN. 61, 62
(1966).
89. See e.g. DAvis, Am:imsIsTA Tl- LAW § 22.11, at 254-56, 264-65; Davis, Standing:
Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. Rav. 601, 626-27 (1968) who doubts that statutes
often intend to protect competitive interests per se. West German Courts and jurists
are not nearly so hesitant, see notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
90. See DAvis, ADrimTms ATV LAW § 22.04, at 220-22; Davis, Standing: Taxpayers
and Others, 35 U. Cm L. Rmv. 601, 627-28 (1968).
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whose demand determines the worth of the enterprise. In the absence
of such a right, entry of new licensees is expected and will not necessarily diminish the worth of the existing businesses.
The aggravation-in-fact standard is also objectionable from another
point of view. The notion of "injury" connotes an objective state of
affairs which can be discovered by any court with the proper sensitivities. But as we have seen, injury in the legal sense actually presupposes the existence, recognition, and violation of a right." Thus,
the aggravation-in-fact approach by-passes the weighing of interests,
costs, and goals which is necessarily prerequisite to creation or denial
of a new right. The German solution is commendable at least insofar
as it focuses the court's attention on the proper issue: Does or does not
a particular interest in government benefits deserve to be treated as
a right?
In practice, the West German and American approaches to the
standing problem diverge only in degree. The courts of both countries
deal with essentially the same subject matter: contested welfare benefits, challenges to competing licenses, private attempts to enforce
building and zoning codes, and applications for subsidies and challenges to their distribution. The only major difference appears to be
the German courts' deep involvement in school administration. Expansion of our domestic welfare programs and recent decisions by the
United States Supreme Court,92 will probably increase the amount of
welfare litigation in this country to a level comparable with that in
West Germany. American courts on the other hand are more receptive
to competitors' challenges to licenses and subsidies; 9 the aggravationin-fact standard appears to constitute a lower barrier to judicial review
than does the violated right standard. In the enforcement of zoning
regulations, American courts also seem to provide more protection than
do the West German administrative courts.9 4 A remedy similar to the
Common Law action of mandamus is still in a primitive stage of
91. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. ECON. REv. 347, 348,
352-53, 357-58 (1967).
92. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, (1969).
93.
94.
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development in German administrative law; however, the emerging
claim is not considered to be barred by a grant of discretion. 5
2. A Public Law Analogy to Private Rights?
In conclusion, it seems appropriate to examine two points of agreement in the American and West German debates over the standing
requirement. First, nearly everyone involved agrees that rights in
respect to the "new property" are desirable. Those who favor the
violated-right standard believe that the legislator or the courts should
explicitly recognize substantive rights in governmental largesse 20
The proponents of the aggravation-in-fact criterion favor increased
access to the courts for recipients of such largesse.9 7 Since they
contend that substantive rights are inextricably linked with procedural access, they also, in effect, advocate the creation of new rights.
At issue between the two groups is only the manner in which the
creation of new rights should and does in fact proceed.
Jurists on both sides of the debate are fond of alluding to private
law as a model which public law should emulate." The private-law
consists of a relatively neat set of intricately defined rights and duties
which seemingly obviate any standing problems. Jurists generally
believe that life would be simpler, legal certainty heightened, economic
efficiency improved, and fairness guaranteed, if we could only devise
a similar matrix of rights and duties for our public lawY9 Unfortunately, we have never learned exactly what it is about private-law
rights that obviates the standing problem. It is necessary to isolate
that quality and reflect upon the feasibility of incorporating it into the
95. Cf. DAVIS, AzmmIsNRA=Vx LAW § 23.11, at 353-58; L. JA=I, JmIcm CoNTR oL
ox ADunusm=.nv AcrioN 176-84 (1965).
96. Cf. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785-86 (1964); Henke, Das
subjektive Uffentliche Recht auf Einschreiten der Polizei, 1964 DEUTS EMS VERWALTUNGSBLATT 649, 651-54 (1964).
97. See DAvis, ADmiNISTRATIVE LAW § 22.02, at 211, § 22.04, at 222; DAvis, Standing:
Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cnt. L. Rxv. 601, 617-18 (1968).
98. Cf. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 601, 613-14
LJ. 733, 771-78 (1964); HENKE, DAs
(1968); Reich, The New Property, 73 YA
x E=NcHE RE=CU 5-8 (1965).
6v
suajx=
99. Cf. DAVIS, ADum mA'vE LAW § 22.02, at 211; Reich, The New Property, 73
Yale Lj. 733, 786-87 (1964); Coase, Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW
& EcoN. 1, 25-27 (1959); HENEm, DAS SUBJ KTIVM OIENT5iCHE REcHT 7-8, 15-17, 58-61
(1965).
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public-law sphere. However, the results of such analysis undercut the
current optimism as regards the evolution of new public-law rights.
The distinguishing feature of private-law rights is what may be
called their "allocatory content." 00 This is a short-hand description of
the fact that private-law rights associate the use, enjoyment, and
disposition of an object with a particular individual. A corollary of this
notion states that only the holder of the right may liquidate its value
in a court action. Without my permission, a third party has no more
authority to vindicate my rights in my car, than he does to sell or use
it.'' Thus, in the private-law sphere, the standing problem resolves
itself as a matter of definition in terms of the allocatory content of a
private-law right.
Allocatory content is a function of number, specificity, concreteness,
and alienability. There are an unbounded number of private-law
rights. In contrast, an individual's rights against the state are hardly a
score. 0

2

Under the rule-of-law principle, enumeration of such rights

is theoretically unnecessary because man is considered essentially
free.10 3 Furthermore, the referents of private-law rights are both specific and concrete: they range from future interests and personality
rights to contract claims and physical integrity. The individual's rights
against the state, on the other hand, all relate to unspecified governmental interferences with general activities such as speech, privacy,
and religion. The exact content of these rights does not become specific or concrete until some future time."°4 Moreover, rights against the
state are not alienable. This results in part from their lack of specificity and concreteness and, in part, because they are perceived as codified instances of a larger set of freedoms which are, by definition,
100. The notion of "allocatory content" was devised in order to clarify certain
problems in the German law governing unjust enrichment; see von Caemmerer, Bereicherung und Unerlaubte Handlung, 1 FESTSCRIrMT FOR RABEL 333, 352-60 (1954). Compare
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. EcoN. REv. 347, 348-50 (1967)
who speaks of the "allocatory function" of property rights.
101. Cf. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 382-86 (1965).
102. Some of the founding fathers apparently thought that even ten were too many.
103. See note 24 and accompanying text, supra.
104. Compare the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic, 3 PEASLEE, supra
note 3, at 334-37 which guarantees the right to work (§ 15), the right to rest, leisure,
annual vacation and maintenance in case of illness and old age (§ 16); Constitution of
Czechoslovakia, Id. at 225-32, which secures the same rights (§§ 22, 23) and the right to
a free education (§ 24) ; Constitution of the USSR, Id. at 1004, makes similar guarantees
in §§ 118-121.
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inalienable. 0 5 The lack of concreteness, specificity, and alienability of
public-law rights impairs their allocatory function. It is often difficult
to ascertain just who qualifies as the holder of such a right. Absent
allocatory content, it is not a foregone conclusion that only the holder
of the right (if one can be found) may enforce it before the courts. 10
Finally, the ambient individual-state relationship is not conducive
to the creation of true rights in largesse. One of the parties to any
such right happens also to be the creator of the right. The state may,
of course, relinquish its sovereign prerogative and permit itself to be
irrevocably bound. This has, in fact, occurred in connection with
private-law rights and our traditional rights against state interference.
Indeed, the advocates of rights in the new property urge that the state
abandon its prerogative, and accord largesse benefits the same treat10 7
ment as private contracts and real propert.
But the state will not surrender its prerogative over the subject
matter involved in the current standing controversy. The benefits to
which the proposed rights would attach are dissimilar to the referents
of the individual's traditional rights against the state. Subsidies,
welfare, and access to public facilities all possess definite pecuniary
value and have private-law counterparts which are continually objects
of commercial exchange. They display a potential allocatory content
very similar to that of private-law rights. This quality makes them an
extremely useful tool for "social engineering," because allocatory
content associates a particular individual with a particular tangible
good. Manipulation of this good can effect changes in the individual's
behavior.
For example, agricultural subsidies and investment credits enable
the state to exert control over the size and distribution of its work
105. See UN=TED STATES D cLaRATXoN or IwDEPE=DmE, para. 2.
106. The breakdown of the traditional standing doctrines is manifested in the advent
of the "public-action" or "private attorney generals;" see L. JAITE, JUniCAL. CoNaTRo
or AinvNSTRAsrvW ACITox 460-65, 475-85, 492-94 (1965); and in the sufficiency of an

infinitesimal small "stake;" see Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHrE. L.
Rav. 601, 613 (1968); and, in West German law, in the "abstrakte Normen-Kontrolle,"
GG § 93(I) (2) (translated in 3 PEASrEE, supra note 3, at 383) which permits anyone to
contest the incompatibility of state law with federal law or the Constitution; see HssE,
VERWAT.TuNGSPEcT 245-47 (1967).
107. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 771-72, 778-79, 785-87 (1964);
compare Henke, Das subjektive iffentliche Recht auf Einschreiten der Polizei, 1964
DEuTscnES VRwALTUNGsBIATr 649, 653-54 (1964), who contends that a mere abandonment of prerogative is not sufficient to establish a true right against the state.
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force. By means of welfare and social security payments, the state can
influence aggregate demand. The issuance of licenses-whether for
liquor concessions or airline routes-has obvious social and economic
consequences, as do dispensations from zoning ordinances.
The argument for the creation of true "rights" in governmental
benefits must contend with one fundamental and unavoidable dilemma
which faces every welfare economy. In a welfare state, the government is obligated to guarantee the citizen the satisfaction of certain
minimum "needs." ' These needs involve employment, health, old age
insurance, maternity benefits, education, public utilities, rapid transit,
social security, etc. No doubt an economy can be programmed to
satisfy these wants. One "cost" of such a program may, however, consist in the imposition of certain constraints upon the creation of true
individual "rights" to such benefits. 10 9
Long-term full employment is maintained, in part, by fiscal measures designed to either accelerate or retard economic activity: subsidies may be denied or granted, social security benefits increased or
decreased, additional government contracts issued or cancelled. Thus,
in order to secure employment-which is one object of the new property and a possible referent for a new right-the state must retain its
sovereign prerogative over other measures which reformers would also
elevate to the status of a "right."
Similar difficulties arise with respect to other objects of the new
property. In order to insure that the value of welfare services remains
constant in real terms, the state may need to control inflationary tendencies by imposing constraints upon spending. This is achieved not
only through taxes but also by withdrawing contracts, subsidies, and
benefits from other areas of the economy.
The dilemma is obvious: it is impossible to secure the position of
the individual vis-4-vis the welfare state by creating "rights" in the
services and benefits which the state must provide in order to fulfill
its welfare obligation. A reliable supply of these services presupposes
108. Cf. FoRsTPOrF, VERWALT"!GSREC'ET 70-73, 340-45 (9th ed. 1966).
109. This possibility has been formulated in terms of the dependency of the individual upon the state; cf. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 756-59 (1964) ;
FORSTHOFF, VERWALTUNGSRECHT 71-73 (9th ed. 1966). See also the decision of the Hessian
State Supreme Administrative Court reprinted in 1959 DiE 6PPENTLICHE VERWALTUNo
706, 707 (1959).
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control of the economy from which the benefits originate. Under the
present state of the economic sciences, this necessary control is
achieved through manipulation of the very benefits which constitute
the new property. Thus, these benefits cannot be made the referents of
rights without endangering the very thing which the rights should
protect: the individual's stake in the welfare state.
There remains only to draw the implications of these observations
for the present controversy over standing to contest administrative
dispositions of government largesse. While tempers flare over nonexistent differences between aggravations-in-fact and violated rights,
everyone agrees that new rights are desirable. The results of this
study favor neither one side nor the other but oppose both views insofar as they favor extension of the individual's rights against the state.
Both sides of the controversy are subject to the same dilemma: creation of rights in government largesse may be, quite literally, selfdefeating.
The dilemma demonstrates, if nothing else, that the arguments
advanced in the present standing controversy are not responsive to
certain fundamental issues. First, it is necessary to determine the
extent to which the sovereign prerogative over certain economic controls can be relinquished without forfeiting the benefits which accrue
from proper manipulation of these controls. Second, the legal profession may have to admit that government largesse is not simply a free
cake to be divided among its clients-be they welfare recipients, cab
drivers, or the defense industries.
Today, largesse is part of an economic system in which absence of
rights may be the price of the cake. If it is true that the existence of
the cake is incompatible with rights in the cake, then lawyers must
rethink their approach to the problem of protecting the individual in
his relations with the state. It is no longer a question of cake or no
cake; the welfare state is probably an irreversible fact. The issue is,
rather, how to protect the individual outside the traditional framework
of public-law rights and duties.
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